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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF A TORRENS
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
By LORING M. STAPLES*
T HE primary purpose of the so-called "Torrens System" of
registering title to real estate has been defined to be the
"creation of an indefeasible title in the registered owner, and the
simplification of the transfer of land."' -An indefeasible title,
represented by a certificate conclusive of the owner's rights as
against the world, and upon which purchasers could conclusively
rely, would be an ideal well worthy of accomplishment, and ex-
amination of the various Torrens title acts in force in this
country and the British colonies leaves no doubt but that the,
framers had such a purpose in mind.' The Minnesota act,8 for
*Of the Minneapolis Bar.
'Baart v. Martin, (1906) 99 Minn. 204, 207, 108 N.W..945, 116 A.S.R.
394. "The purpose of this statute is to create a judgment in rem per-
petually conclusive. Other proceedings in rem may determine the status
of a ship or other chattel that is transient; this legislation provides for a
decree that shall conclude the title to an interest that is to be as lasting
as the land itself." Smith v. Martin, (1910) 69 Misc. 108, 111, 124 N.Y.S.
1064. "Besides clearing and registering the title and facilitating its trans-
fer, the Torrens Systems practically guarantees, in behalf of the state,
that the holder of a registered certificate of title has an absolute and
indefeasible interest which can never be questioned on any ground what-
ever." A. H. Robbins, The Torrens System of Land Registration, (1902)
54 Cent. L. Jour. 282, 290.2 Torrens acts are in force in the following states: California, Stats.
1897, p. 138, amended and redrafted, Stats. 1905, p. 1932, Henning's Gen.
Laws, Cal., (1920) Act 5194; Colorado, Laws, 1903, ch. 139, Mills Ann.
Stats., secs. 856-957; Georgia, Acts, 1917, p. 108, Park's Ann. Code, (1922
Suppl.) Title 2, ch. 8; Illinois Laws, 1897, p. 141, R.S. 1921, ch. 30;
Massachusetts, Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 185; Minnesota, Laws, 1905, ch. 305,
G.S. 1913, secs. 6868-6950; Nebraska, Laws, 1915, ch. 225; New York,
Laws, 1908, ch. 444, Real Prop. Law, 1909 art. 12; North Carolina, Laws,
1913, ch. 90, C.S. 1919, vol. I, ch. 47; North Dakota, Laws, 1917, ch. 235;
Ohio, Gen. Code, 1921, secs. 8572-1, 8572-118; Oregon, Laws, 1901, p.
438, C.L. 1920, secs. 9940-10052; South Dakota, Laws, 1917, ch. 368, R.C.
1919, secs. 3060-3143; Tennessee, Acts, 1917, ch. 63, Ann. Code, 1917, secs.
3793a3-3793a96; Utah, Laws, 1917, p. 51, C.L. 1917, secs. 4920-5008; Vir-
ginia, Laws, 1916, ch. 62; Washington, Laws, 1907, p. 693, C.S. 1922, secs.
10622-10726. Some of these, however, only provide for the registration
of land in certain designated counties. Practically all of the British
colonies have Torrens Title acts. A modified type is in force in England
itself. See J. E. Hogg, Australian Torrens System, (London, 1905);
Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire, (London, 1920).3The original act is found in Minn., -Laws, 1901, ch. 237; amended,
Laws, 1903, ch. 234. The act was redrawn in 1905 (Laws. 1905, ch. 305)
and has been retained in practically this form in Minn., G.S., 1913, secs.
6868-6950. Land in any county may now be registered: Laws, 1909, ch.
183, see. 2.
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example,4 provides that after the expiration of a period of six
months3 from the date of granting a decree of registration, the
decree:
"Shall bind the land described therein and shall forever quiet
the title thereto, and shall be forever binding and conclusive upon
all persons, whether mentioned by name in the summons, or in-
cluded in the phrase, 'all other persons or parties unknown claim-
ing any right, title, estate, lien or interest in the real estate de-
scribed in the application herein,' and such decree shall not be
reopened, vacated or set aside, by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding at law or in equity for opening, vacating, setting aside
or reversing judgments and decrees, except as herein especially
provided.""
And the certificate of title, or the owner's duplicate thereof:
"Shall be received in evidence in all the courts of the state, and
shall be conclusive evidence of all the matters and things con-
tained therein."7
The original act' went no further. It provided no method
of preserving the rights of those of whom no jurisdiction had
been obtained, or of those deprived of their interests through
fraud, Minnesota being almost alone among all the states and
British and American colonies which have adopted the Torrens
system in omitting all mention of fraudY Apparently, then, the
purpose of the Minnesota statute was to make the decree and
certificate of registration absolutely indefeasible upon the expira-
tion of a short statute of limitation, and to relegate the unjustly
deprived to consolation from an "assurance fund."1° This statute
4For obvious reasons, the Minnesota Torrens act has been used as an
example throughout this article. Unless otherwise stated, statutory refer-
ences in subsequent notes are to the Minnesota statute.
5 1t was sixty days in the original statute. Minn., Laws, 1901, ch.
237, sec. 29.
OMinn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6889.7Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6903.
sMinn., Laws, 1901, ch. 237.
9Baart v. Martin, (1906) 99 Minn. 204, 108 N.W. 945, 116 A.S.R.
394. "An examination of the Torrens laws of the different states and
colonies discloses the fact that those of Minnesota and the Fiji Islands
only contain no express exception in cases of fraud"-per Elliott, J., p. 207.
But it appears that there are provisions even in the Fiji Islands for
protecting the interests of the defrauded. See W. C. Niblack, An Analysis
of the Torrens System of Conveying Land, (Chicago, 1912) p. 217, citing
section 14 of the Fiji Act.
1O"Assurance Fund-Investment-All money received by the registrar
under the provisions of the preceding section shall immediately be paid
by him to the country treasurer as an assurance fund . . .
"Damages Through Erroneous Registration-Action-Any person who,
without negligence on his part, sustains any loss or damage by reason
of any omission, mistake or misfeasance of the registrar or his deputy,
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was declared constitutional by the unanimous opinion of the
supreme court of Minnesota within a year after its passage,"-
and, with one exception, a similar conclusion has been reached
by the courts of other states where Torrens Acts have been
enacted. 2 Yet it was pointed out by the Minnesota court in ren-
dering its opinion at that time that the statute could not operate
to divest the rights of claimants in possession not personally
served with notice of the registration proceedings, 13 and a few
years later the same court held that as long as the title remained
registered in the name of one guilty of fraud in procuring regis-
tration his decree and certificate might be set aside in an action
brought by the defrauded party, the latter being only required
to act within a "reasonable time."' 4  Subsequent to this decision,
the Minnesota statute was amended to provide for the impeach-
ment of titles fraudulently registered. 15
Lack of jurisdiction and fraud, therefore, are two possible
defects that may prevent a Torrens certificate from being con-
or of any examiner, or of any clerk of court, or of his deputy, in the
performance of their respective duties under this law, and any person,
who, without negligence on his part, is wrongfully deprived of any land
or of any interest therein by the registration thereof, or by reason of
the registration of any other person, as the owner of such land, or by
reason of any mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate of
title, or in any entry or memorial, or by any cancellation, in the register
of titles, and who, by the provisions of this law, is precluded from bringing
an action for the recovery of such land, or of any interest therein, or
from enforcing any claim or lien upon the same, may institute an action
in the district court to recover compensation out of the assurance fund
for such loss or damage." Minn., G.S., 1913, secs. 6942, 6943.
"State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W.
175, 57 L.R.A. 297, 89 A.S.R. 57, 54 Cent. L. Jour. 290.
"2Robinson v. Kerrigan, (1907) 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129, 121 A.S.R.
90, 12 Ann. Cas. 829; White v. Ainsworth, (1917) 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac.
959, Ann. Cas. 1918E 179; People ex rel, Deneen v. Simon, (1898) 176
Ill. 165, 52 N.E. 910, 44 L.R.A. 801, 68 A.S.R. 175; Tyler v. Judges of
Registration, (1900) 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, 51 L.R.A. 433, writ of
error dismissed on jurisdictional grounds only, (1900) 179 U.S. 405, 21
S.C.R. 206, 45 L.Ed. 252; Drake v. Frazer, (1920) 105 Nebr. 162, 179
N.W. 393, 11 A.L.R. 766; Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, (1920) 56 Utah
587, 192 Pac. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752. Contra: People ex rel. Kern v. Chase,
(1895) 165 Ill. 527, 46 N.E. 454, 36 L.R.A. 105 (old act) ; State ex rel.
Monnett v. Guilbert, (1897) 56 Oh. St. 575, 47 N.E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519,
60 A.S.R. 756 (old act).
"3State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 445, 89
N.W. 175, 57 L.R.A. 297, 89 A.S.R. 57, 54 Cent. L. Jour. 290.
14Baart v. Martin, (1906) 99 Minn. 204, 108 N.W. 945, 116 A.S.R. 394.
15The last line of sec. 49, Minn. Laws, 1905, (Minn., G.S., 1913, sec.
6918) provides: "In all cases of registration which are procured by fraud,
the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." Although found in a
section dealing with the transfer of registered land, this presumably also
applies to initial registration.
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clusive. It is obvious, also, that the aura of indefeasibility which
surrounds a Torrens certificate will constantly tempt the un-
scrupulous to employ the system for turning bad titles into good
ones, and the presence of an examiner of titles,16 whose busi-
ness it is to prevent such occurrences, has not, and probably
will not, in the future, entirely eliminate such a practice.1 7 Sooner
or later, by some hook or crook, a bad title will be registered, and
the decree of registration will, in turn, be attacked by the rightful
owner of the land.
It is possible, although improbable, (as the Minnesota court
has pointed out18), that want of jurisdiction may exist alone, with-
out the presence of fraud. The Minnesota statute contains the
following provisions relative to jurisdiction for registration pro-
ceedings:
"The summons . . shall be served in the manner now
provided by law for the service of a summons in civil actions in
the district court, except as herein otherwise provided.
It shall be served upon all persons who are not residents of the
state, and upon all other persons or parties unknown claiming any
right, title, estate or interest in the real estate described in the
application herein by publishing the same in a newspaper printed
and published in the county wherein the application is filed, once
each week for three consecutive weeks.
"The clerk shall also, within twenty (20) days after the first
publication of the summons, send a copy thereof by mail to all
defendants who are not residents of the state and whose place
of address is known to applicant. . . . Other or further
notice of application for registration may be given in such
manner, and to such persons as the court or any jury thereof
may direct."'"
It is to be observed that only known, resident claimants need
be personally served, and that it has been held perfectly constitu-
tional to obtain jurisdiction of iinknown resident and knownt or
unknown non-resident claimants by publication.2 0  Consequently,
1GMinn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6879. His duties are set forth in the sub-
sequent section.
17"Unfortunately, the act has been advertised, and is being advertised
by some attorneys seeking employment, as a means of making bad titles
good, all of which has reflected upon this system of registering titles."
Petition of Sherman, (1919) 106 Misc. 244, 246, 175 N.Y.S. 627.
'sState ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W.
175, 57 L.R.A. 297, 89 A.S.R. 57, 54 Cent. L. Jour. 290.
'
9Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6883.
2OAmerican Land Co. v. Zeiss, (1911) 219 U.S. 47, 31 S.C.R. 200,
55 L.Ed. 82; Mills v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., (1912) 198 Fed. 137; State
ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall. (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W. 175, 57 L.R.A.
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if we exclude fraud from our consideration, there are few possi-
ble border line situations where want of jurisdiction may operate
by itself to invalidate a decree; as, for example, where an un-
known claimant in possession of the land to be registered is not
served personally with notice. In such a case, the possessor's
rights are not conclusively terminated by the decree.2 1 An equally
rare case would be where the certificate, through error, described
more land than was sought to be registered. Such a certificate
could hardly be conclusive.
22
Where an initial decree of registration is concerned, the ques-
tions of fraud and want of jurisdiction are usually present to-
gether. For example, A wishes to register his title to Blackacre.
He fears that B, a resident claimant, may have a superior title,
and consequently by fraudulent means prevents B from being a
party to the proceedings and no personal service of notice of
them is made upon him. A obtains a certificate of title. In such
a situation the law is clear that B may attack A's title and have
it vacated, if he acts within a reasonable time ;23 he may even
attack it collaterally, if the want of jurisdiction appears affirma-
tively upon the face of the records in the office of the registrar
of titles.2 4  Inasmuch as want of jurisdiction is in itself a fatal
defect to the validity of registration proceedings, it is unnecessary
297, 89 A.S.R. 57, 54 Cent. L. Jour. 290; Hunt v. Hay, (1915) 214 N.Y.
578, 108 N.E. 851. See also cases cited in note 12, supra, all dealing with
this question.21State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W.
175, 57 L.RA. 297, 89 A.S.R. 57, 54 Cent. L. Jour. 290 (semble). Contra:
Alba v. de la Cruz, (1910) 17 Philippine 49.22Petition of Furness et al., (Cal. App. 1923) 218 Pac. 61; Marsden
v. McAlister, (1887) 8 N.S.W.L. Rep. 300; Hay v. Solling, (1894) 16
N.S.W.L. Rep. 60; Hogg, Australian Torrens System 828.
23Follette v. Pacific Light & Power Corp., (1922) 189 Cal. 193, 208
Pac. 295, 23 A.L.R. 965; Rock Run Iron Co. v. Miller, (Ga. 1923) 118
S.E. 670; Dewey v. Kimball et al., (1903) 89 Minn. 454, 95 N.W. 317,
895, 96 N.W. 704; Baart v. Martin, (1906) 99 Minn. 204, 108 N.W. 945,
116 A.S.R. 394; Riley v. Pearson, (1913) 120 Minn. 210, 139 N.W. 361,
L.R.A. 1916D 7; Arnold v. Smith, (1913) 121 Minn. 116, 140 N.W. 748;
Henry v. White, (1913) 123 Minn. 182, 143 N.W. 324, L.R.A. 1916D 4
(semble); Hawes v. Clark, (1913) 159 App. Div. 65, 144 N.Y.S. 11; Kirk
v. Mullen, (1921) 100 Ore. 563, 197 Pac. 300.24Petition of Furness et al., (Cal. App., 1923) 218 Pac. 61; Riley v.
Pearson, (1913) 120 Minn. 210, 139 N.W. 361, L.R.A. 1916D 7; Arnold v.
Smith, (1913) 121 Minn. 116, 140 N.W. 748 (semble); Henry v. White,
(1913) 123 Minn. 182, 143 N.W. 324, L.R.A. 1916D 4 (semble).
Conversely, there can be no collateral attack unless the error or want
of jurisdiction appears affirmatively on the face of the record. State ex rel.
Coburn v. Ries, (1913) 123 Minn. 397, 143 N.W. 981, L.R.A. 1916D 1;
Jones v. Wellcome, (1916) 141 Minn. 352, 170 N.W. 224. See also Mooney
v. Valentynovicz, (1912) 255 Ill. 118, 99 N.E. 344.
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at this time to entertain the question of what acts constitute
fraud.
The third, and most involved situation is where no question
of want of jurisdictioh is involved, but fraud is present. For
example, A wishes to register his title to Blackacre. B also
has an interest in the premises, but A persuades him not to appear
in the proceedings, although he has "been served with notice of
them, and promises to see to it that B's interest, let us say that
of a partner, appears on the certificate of registration. A then
obtains a decree and certificate naming him (A) as the owner in
fee without mention of B. This is obvious fraud, and A cannot
rely on his certificate of title as indefeasible as against B.2 5 Regis-
tration is no defense, likewise, where land has been transferred
in fraud of creditors. 26 But, on the other hand, if there is juris-
diction of B, and B loses his rights in the land because of
mistake or negligence on his own part, and not because of any
influence A has brought to bear, A's title is indefeasible."
It is necessary at this point to define what is meant by the
term "fraud." We have seen that jurisdiction for the purpose
of registration proceedings can constitutionally be obtained as to
unknown residents or known non-residents by publication. Sup-
pose A, who wishes to register his title, has no actual notice of
B, who is a resident and claims an interest in the land, but could
have been aware of his existence by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or was with notice of facts that should have put him
on inquiry that would have disclosed B's interest. Or assume a
much commoner situation: that A is aware of B and his interest
and is also aware that B is residing in another jurisdiction at an
2SHamel v. Feigh, (1919) 143 Minn. 115, 173 N.W. 570; Henry v.
White, (1913) 123 Minn. 182, 143 N.W. 324, L.R.A. 1916D 4 (semble);
Lake Yew v. Port Swettenham Rubber Co., (1913) A.C. 491, 82 L.J.P.C.
89. A purchaser for value, relying on the certificate, of course, gets a
good title. See White v. Ainsworth, (1917) 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac. 959,
Ann. Cas. 1918E 179.
2oMorris v. Small, (1908) 160 Fed. 142; Cunningham v. Bright, (1919)
228 Mass. 385, 117 N.E. 909. Contra: Pick & Co. v. Natalby, (1918) 211
Ill. App. 486.27Cooper et al. v. Buxton, (1921) 186 Cal. 330, 199 Pac. 6; Mooney
v. Valentynovicz, (1912) 255 Ill. 118, 99 N.E. 344; Mooney v. Valen-
tynovicz, (1914) 262 Ill. 355, 104 N.E. 645; Rasch v. Rasch, (1917) 278
II1. 261, 115 N.E. 871; Studley v. Kip et al., (Mass. 1923) 139 N.E. 485;
Doyle v. Wagner, (1909) 108 Minn. 443, 122 N.W. 316; State ex rel.
Coburn v. Ries, (1913) 123 Minn. 397, 143 N.W. 981, L.R.A. 1916D 1;
Murphy v. Borgen, (1921) 148 Minn. 375, 182 N.W. 449.
Fraud of third persons in which the registered owner did not par-
ticipate and of which he had no knowledge, is not sufficient to avoid
a register. Coleman v. Riria Puwhanga, (1886) 4 N.Z.S.C. 230.
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unknown address and who, it is safe to assume, will never read
the notice published in some local newspaper of limited circula-
tion that would inform him that the land is being registered. Is
A tainted with fraud in case he registers the land to the exclusion
of B under either of the above sets of circumstances? It is ap-
parent that if a duty of diligent inquiry is to be imposed upon
the applicant for registration, and if notice by itself, actual or
constructive, of outstanding claims can taint him with fraud, de-
crees of registration will be subject to constant danger of attack
and will be no more conclusive than judgments in actions to quiet
title. Needless to say, such a result would clearly be at cross
purposes with the obvious intent of the Torrens System to have
the decree of registration as conclusive as possible, and this in-
tent should have strong weight with the courts. The Privy Council
has settled this question, as far as the British colonies are con-
cerned, in what would appear to be a most logical way, holding
that the fraud necessary to permit impeachment of a registered
title must be actdal fraud; that is, conduct amounting to actual
dishonesty in obtaining registration; not what is called construc-
tive or equitable fraud. It must be "brought home" to the party
whose title it is sought to impeach.28 An abstract definition of
this sort has not as yet been given by any American court, 2 as
lack of jurisdiction is generally coupled with fraud in American
cases, and the decision turns upon this.
Questions of fraud arise most frequently in connection with
land already registered. For example, A is the registered owner
of land. He mortgaged it to B, but neglects to entrust B with
his duplicate certificate of title and B is unable to obtain a
memorial of the mortgage on A's certificate filed with the registrar
of titles.30  But until this memorial is entered, the mortgage
28Assets Co. v. Mere Roihi, [1905] A.C. 176, 74 L.J.P.C. 49. "But
if it be shown that his suspicions were aroused, and that he abstained
from making inquiries for fear of learning the truth, the case is very
different, and fraud may be properly ascribed to him"-per Lord Lindley,
p. 210.
29In Dewey v. Kimball et al., (1903) 89 Minn. 454, 95 N.W. 317, 895,
96 N.W. 704, the court implied, obiter dicta, that the applicant for regis-
tration is bound to follow upon notice sufficient to put on inquiry and in-
vestigation. The supreme court of California has implied to the con-
trary. See Hoffman v. Superior Court, etc., (1907) 151 Cal. 386, 90
Pac. 939.
30"No new certificate of title shall be entered or issued, and no
memorial shall be made upon any certificate of title in pursuance of any
deed, or other voluntary instrument, unless the owner's duplicate is pre-
sented therewith, except in cases provided for in this law or upon the order
of the court. . . ." Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6918.
TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
operates only as a contract between the parties and does not in
any way affect the land.3 A now deeds the land to C, who
pays full value for it, but knows of B's mortgage. C never-
theless obtains A's duplicate certificate of title and with the aid
of it procures a new certificate in his own name as owner in
fee. Under the old recording acts, of course, inasmuch as C is
not a bona fide purchaser, he would hold the title subject to B's
mortgage.3 2  The Torrens acts, however, usually provide that
unless a certificate is obtained by fraud, it is conclusive of the
holder's rights, and it has been generally held that obtaining title
with mere knowledge of the existence of an unregistered interest
is not fraud, although conduct amounting to dishonesty in obtain-
ing a deed and registering it for the express purpose of shutting
out unregistered interest may be. This is the situation in several
of the British colonies, where "fraud" is not defined in the
statute itself.33 Most of the Torrens acts, particularly in this
country, expressly declare that actual or constructive notice of
any- unregistered interest shall not "of itself" be imputed as
fraud, 4 and where such a statute is in force, a certificate of regis-
tration obtained with knowledge of interests not apparent on the
face of the certificate of the vendor cannot be questioned on that
score alone. 3 Of course, registering so as to exclude such in-
31" . . . No voluntary instrument of conveyance purporting to
convey or affect registered land, except a will, and a lease for a term not
exceeding three years, shall take effect as a conveyance, or bind or affect
the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties, and as
authority to the registrar to make registration. The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land." Minn., G.S., 1913,
sec. 6914.3 2
"Every conveyance of real estate shall be recorded in the office of
the register of deeds of the county where such real estate is situated; and
every conveyance not so recorded shall be void, as against any subsequent
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real
estate or any part thereof whose conveyance is first duly recorded. Minn.,
G.S., 1913, sec. 6844 (recording act).3 3Assets Co. v. Mere Roihi, [1905] A.C. 176, 74 L.J.P.C. 49; Hogg,
Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire, 120-124; Niblack, An
Analysis of the Torrens System of Conveying Land, 226.
34For example, the Illinois statute provides (R.S. 1921, ch. 30, sec. 84)
par. 42. "Except in case of fraud, and except as herein otherwise pro-
vided, no person taking a transfer of registered land, or any estate or
interest therein, or of any charge upon the same, from the registered
owner shall be held to inquire into the circumstances under which or the
consideration for which such owner or any previously registered owner
was registered, or be affected with notice, actual or constructive of any
unregistered trust, lien, claim, denand, or interest; and the knowledge that
an unregistered trust, lien, clain, demand or interest is in existence shall
not of itself be inputed as fraud."3 5Bjornberg v. Meyers et al., (1918) 212 Ill. App. 257. See also
Brace v. Superior Land Co. et al., (1911) 65 Wash. 681, 118 Pac. 910;
Gauder v. Dassenaike et al., [1897] A.C. 547, 66 L.J.P.C. 103, 77 L.T. 321.
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terests may, under certain circumstances, amount to fraud, as
where there is collusion with the vendor. 6 In other words, un-
registered interests in registered land are void not only as against
subsequent registering bona fide purchasers of the land, as is
the case under the recording acts, but also as against subsequent
registering purchasers not guilty of downright intentional dis-
honesty. This result, although it may seem harsh, is quite in
accord with the Torrens idea: to have the certificate so conclusive
of the title to land that purchasers need only scan its face to see
what they are getting.
Some of the Torrens title acts, however, in providing f6r the
transfer of registered land, make the title of the transferee, once
registered, indefeasible only in case the transferee is a bona fide
purchaser, and not if he is merely free from fraud. Strangely
enough, the Minnesota act, which attempted to make the initial
decree of registration so conclusive, is of this group.3 7  Need-
less to say, this is hardly in accord with the Torrens idea of
making the certificate conclusive as against the world, and, it is
submitted, amounts to a reversion to the theory of the recording
acts. It requires the would-be purchaser to look beyond the
owner's certificate, which was the very thing the Torrens System
was devised to make unnecessary. In Minnesota, it would seem,
a purchaser from a registered owner would not be protected if
he had notice, actual or constructive, at the time he made his
purchase that an unregistered interest was outstanding. He is
not permitted to shut his eyes and rely on the vendor's certificate
alone. From analogy to decisions under the recording acts, it
would seem to follow that notice of prior unregistered interests
obtained after completion of the purchase, but before registering,
would prevent the purchaser from being bona fide, since under the
Torrens statute he does not obtain any title at all until he
registers. 8
36Turner v. Clark, (1909) 2 Sask. L. R. 200.37
"Every person receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who re-
ceives a certificate of title in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
shall hold the same free from all incumbrances and adverse claims. . .
Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892.
S.. Whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration, the production of the owner's duplicate certificate shall author-
ize the registrar to enter a new certificate, or to make a memorial of
registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate
or memorial shall be binding upon the registered owner, and upon all
persons claiming under him in favor of every purchaser for value and in
good faith. . . .. Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6918.
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But even in jurisdictions where the Minnesota statute is not
followed the purchaser of registered land is not permitted to rely
conclusively on the owner's certificate under all circumstances.
Where this certificate has been procured by fraud, all of the Tor-
rens acts apparently require the presence of a bona fide purchaser
to remove the stigma. For example: A procures registration of
Blackacre, defrauding B. A then deeds to C, who obtains a new
certificate in his own name. In order that C's title be indefeasible,
C must not merely be a purchaser free from fraud, but bona
fide as well.3 9 C must have no notice of B, actual or constructive;
he cannot shut his eyes and rely on A's certificate. This is probably
a bit out of line with the Torrens ideal, but likewise probably
necessary. A recent California case, Follette v. Pacific Light and
Power CorporatioW'0 presented the following situation: B pur-
chased an easement over A's land and erected a power transmis-
sion line on it. A obtained registration of his land as owner
in fee without mention of the easement, and fraudulently pre-
vented notice of the registration proceedings from being served
on B. A then sold the land to C, who had no notice of B, and
relied on A's certificate. It was held that B's easement was still
valid, even as against C. The California statute provided that:
"In case of fraud, any person defrauded shall have all rights
and remedies that he would have had if the land were not under
the provisions of this act; provided, that nothing contained in
this section shall affect the title of a registered owner who has
taken bona fide for a valuable consideration, or of any person
claiming through or under him .
3SThe rule in Minnesota under the recording act is that notice, obtained
before the purchase is complete, prevents the purchaser from being bona
fide. Minor v. Willoughby et al., (1859) 3 Minn. 225, (154); Marsh v.
Armstrong, (1873) 20 Minn. 81, (66). Inasmuch as recording the deed
acts merely as notice to future purchasers, notice obtained between com-
pletion of the purchase and recording has no effect whatsoever. Long v.
Wright, (1921) 70 Colo. 173, 197 Pac. 1916. But under the Torrens statute
the purchase is not complete until the deed is registered, even though the
money has all been paid and the deed taken. Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6914,
note 31, supra. Accordingly, it would seem to follow that notice acquired
prior to registering prevents the purchaser from being bona fide.
30The Illinois act provides as follows, (II., R.S. 1921, ch. 30, sec. 84),
par. 40: "The registered owner of any estate or interest in land brought
under this act shall, except in cases of fraud to which he is a party,
or of the person through whom he claims without valuable consideration
paid in good faith, hold the same subject to the charges hereinbefore set
forth and also only to such estates, mortgages, liens, charges and interests
as may be noted in the last certificate of title in the registrar's office,
and free of all others."
40(1922) 189 Cal. 193, 208 Pac. 295, 23 A.L.R. 965.
4'Henning's Cal. Gen. Laws, 1920, Act 5194, sec. 37.
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" .No unregistered estate, interest, power, right,
claim contract or trust shall prevail against the title of a registered
owner taking bona fide for a valuable consideration, or of any
person claiming through or under him."
4 2
There was also the usual provision as to the conclusive nature
of a certificate of title.43  Inasmuch as B was in possession of
the land at the time of A's sale to C, C was held not to be a bona
fide purchaser; adverse possession being, of course, always con-
structive notice.
44
Another type of constructive notice that might be invoked to
upset the title of purchasers of registered land has been suggested
in several Minnesota cases; that where an examination of the pro-
ceedings to register the land in question would disclose error
or want of jurisdiction, the purchaser is not bona fide, at least
where the error or want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively.45
Likewise, if by chance the memorial of an encumbrance on
registered land is entered on the certificate of title on file with the
Registrar of Titles, but not entered on the duplicate certificate of
the owner thereof, a subsequent purchaser is charged with notice
of this encumbrance, although he may have no actual notice of
it.46 It is worth noting here that conveyances of, and all instru-
ments affecting the title to registered land that have been filed with
the Registrar are indexed and retained by him." Is the purchaser
of registered land affected with constructive notice of the pos-
sible invalidity or legal effect of these instruments? Assume, for
example, that A is the owner of registered land. A deed is drawn
up in which B is named as grantee, but which is incorrectly
acknowledged, or signed, or improperly witnessed. Neverthe-
less, on the strength of this instrument, a new certificate of title
is issued in B's name. C now wishes to buy the land. Is C
charged with constructive notice of the defect in the A to B
deed on file with the registrar? The statute permits him to rely
42Henning's Cal. Gen. Laws, 1920, Act 5194, sec. 39.
43See Henning's Cal. Gen. Laws, 1920, Act 5194, secs. 16, 34.
44For a recent example of the limits to which this doctrine is some-
times carried, see the recent case of Hauger v. J. P. Rodgers Land Co.,
et al., (Minn. 1923) 194 N.W. 95.
45Dicta to this effect are found in the following cases: Riley v. Pear-
son, (1913) 120 Minn. 210, 139 N.W. 361, L.R.A. 1916D 7; Henry v.
W3jhite, (1913) 123 Minn. 182, 143 N.W. 324, L.R.A. 1916D 4; Jones v.
Wellcome, (1919) 141 Minn. 352, 170 N.W. 224.
46Christenson v. Christenson, (Ore. 1923) 219 Pac. 615; Niblack, Tor-
rens System, sec. 63. See also, Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6915.
47Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6905.
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conclusively on the certificate only if he acts in good faith,48, and
the invalid deed is certainly open to his inspection. 9 So far, a
question of this sort has never been raised in the courts. If it
should be held that the purchaser is affected with notice of instru-
ments on file with the registrar, a long step back to the old "chain
of title" system will have been taken. Arguments to the contrary
would be based on the conclusive effect given the issuance of a
new certificate by the registrar. But the registrar is not a judicial
officer, and it is hard to see how an act done in the course of
his ministerial duties could validate an imperfect deed, or give a
deed a legal effect which it did not actually have.50
The California court, in Follette v. Pacific Light and Power
Corporation,51 did not rest its conclusions solely on bona fides,
however. No jurisdiction had been obtained of the party de-
frauded in the registration proceedings in that case, which raised
the question of the protection given property interests by the
"due process" clauses of federal and state constitutions. Can the
Torrens system constitutionally sweep away a property interest
without ever having obtained jurisdiction of the owner, even
where it purports to vest the title in a purchaser for value without
notice? The California court answered this as follows:
"The provisions of the land title law which purport to entitle
the purchaser of a registered title to the premises in the actual
possession and occupancy of another to hold the 'ame superior to
the prior rights and interests of such possessor, notwithstanding
that such registered title is subject to the infirmities shown to
exist in the instant case, are obnoxious to the provision of the
federal constitution, which provides that persons shall not be
deprived of their property without due process of law."
52
The supreme court of Minnesota tends toward a similar con-
clusion:
"It may be correct, though we do not so decide, that a decree
that is void and subject to collateral attack would not be invali-
4SMinn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892.
4 9 See Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6905.
50 The fact that the registrar of titles is given the incidental power to
pass on the validity of instruments affecting registered land filed with
him for registration has been generally held not to be such a delegation
of the judicial power as to render Torrens statutes unconstitutional. Robin-
son v. Kerrigan, (1907) 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129, 121 A.S.R. 90, 12 Ann.
Cas. 829; People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon, (1898) 176 Ill. 165, 52 N.E.
910, 44 L.R.A. 801, 68 A.S.R. 175; Drake'v. Frazer, (1920) 105 Neb.
162, 179 N.W. 393, 11 A.L.R. 766; Contra: State ex rel. Monnett v.
Guilbert, (1897) 56 Oh. St. 575, 47 N.E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 A.S.R. 756.
51(1922) 189 Cal. 193, 208 Pac. 295, 23 A.L.R. 965.52Follette v. Pacific Light and Power Corp., (1922) 189 Cal. 193,
208 Pac. 295, 23 A.L.R. 965.
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dated by a transfer of title to a purchaser, though he paid a
valuable consideration and had no actual knowledge of the facts
which made the decree void."5
If this proposition is sound, as it appears to be, then the rights
of those of whom no jurisdiction has been obtained are not
terminated no matter who it is that holds the certificate of title
to the land in question, or how much of a "bona fide purchaser"
he may have been. Likewise, if the original certificate described,
through error, not only the land sought to be registered but also
land belonging to one over whom no jurisdiction had been ob-
tained, it is probable that a future purchaser for value without
notice relying on it would not be entitled to keep all that he thought
he was getting. In the absence of constitutional protection, the
opposite result seems to have been reached in the British colonies.
54
Although at common law a forged deed was an absolute nullity,
and the transferee had no power to convey a good title to a bona
fide purchaser,55 under the Torrens system the forged deed, if
registered, may become the root of a good title in the bona fide
53Henry v. White, (1913) 123 Minn. 182, 185, 143 N.W. 324, L.R.A.
1916D 4. Although the meaning of this statement is obvious, it is sub-
mitted that the language used is a bit confusing. One cannot be a bona
fide purchaser if he has notice of defects in the title, yet decrees are
only subject to collateral attack if the want of jurisdiction appears affirma-
tively on the face of the registration proceedings.
The courts of Illinois and New York have made similar implications:
"Objection is' also made that by section 26 any person who has any
interest in the land, whether personally served, notified by publication, or
not served at all, must, within two years after the entry of the decree,
appear and file an answer, and that after the expiration of that term of
two years the decree shall (with certain exceptions) be 'forever binding
and conclusive upon all persons.' This provision seems to attempt to make
a decree binding upon persons not parties to the suit, and if given effect
literally, would deprive persons of vested rights without due process of
law. A limitation may be placed upon the time within which a person
who has a mere right of action shall bring it, but limitation laws cannot
compel a resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the com-
plete enjoyment of all he claims. (Cooley, Const. Lims., p. 366). To the
extent that the act attempts to transfer property without due process of
law, it cannot be upheld."-People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon, (1898) 176
Ill. 165, 177-178, 52 N.E. 910, 44 L.R.A. 801, 68 A.S.R. 175.
"A judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter is
of course binding and conclusive upon all persons of whom the court
obtains jurisdiction. It is not binding and controlling upon others... "'
Partenfelder et al. v. People of the State of New York, et al., (1914) 211
N.Y. 355, 357-358, 105 N.E. 675.
See also, American Land Co. v. Zeiss, (1911) 219 U.S. 47, 31 S.C.R.
200, 55 L.Ed. 82. White v..Ainsworth, (1917) 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac. 959,
Ann. Cas. 1918E 179 seems to take the opposite view, however.54Hay v. Soiling, (1894) 16 N.S.W. L.Rep. 60, (semble); Hogg,
Australian Torrens System 828.
5aCole v. Long, (1872) 44 Ga. 579; Sapp v. Cline, (1908) 131 Ga.
433, 62 S.E. 529; D'Wolf v. Haydn, (1860) 24 Ill. 525; Andre v. Hoffman,
(1918) 81 W.Va. 620, 95 S.E. 84.
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purchaser.5 6 B entrusts A with his duplicate certificate; A forges
a deed to himself, has himself registered as the owner and mort-
gages or sells to C, a purchaser for value, who registers his in-
terest in good faith. C's rights are superior to B's.57  If, on the
other hand, the forged deed runs to a fictitious person, in whom
title is registered, and C relies on such a certificate, the wrong-
doer representing himself as the agent of the fictitious party, C
is not protected. 8 The opposite result might well be reached
in this country, in viev of the provisions in most of the Torrens
acts making the owner's duplicate certificate conclusive evidence
of title.-' A would have to procure this to enable C to register,
and if it once got into his hands C would probably be protected,
at least if B was negligent in letting it slip out of his own pos-
session.
One more situation-where land is registered and it is later
discovered that an earlier certificate of registration is in exis-
tence. Incredible as it may appear, this situation has neverthe-
less arisen several times in various British colonies. The courts
56
"A forged transfer or mortgage, which is void at common lav, will,
when duly entered on the register, become the root of a valid title."
Gibbs v. Messer, [1891] A.C. 248, 257, 60 L.J.P.C. 20, 64 L.T. 237. It was
through fear of this that the landlords of England refused to register
their lands under the original English Torrens Act. Even Sir Robert
Richard Torrens, who devised the system bearing his name, is said to
have been of 'this class. .The English Act was later amended to provide
that a forged deed could not be the basis of a good title even though
registered. See Niblack, The Torrens System, its Cost and Complexity,
16, 19. The danger is, of course, much diminished under a constitutional
form of government where property rights are jealously protected. How-
ever, at least one of the states where Torrens statutes have been enacted
contains a provision that a forged deed can never become the basis of a
good title through registration. See Virginia, Laws, 1916, ch. 62, sec. 74.57Gibbs v. Messer, [1891] A.C. 248, 60. L.J.P.C. 20, 64 L.T. 237,
(semble); M'Vity v. Tranouth, [1908] A.C. 60, 77 L.J.P.C. 37, 97 L.T.
853, 24 T.L.R. 165; Brown v. Broughton, (1915) 25 Man. Rep. 489. The
dictum to the contrary in Baart v. Martin, (1906) 99 Minn. 204, 206, 108
N. W. 945, 116 A.S.R. 394, is obviously based upon a misreading of Gibbs
v. Messer, supra. The rightful owner has even been denied reimburse-
ment from the "assurance fund." Fawkes v. Attorney General, (1903) 6
Ont. L. R. 490.
The purchaser, however, must be bona fide; he cannot rely con-
clusively on the wrongdoer's certificate. Robinson v. Ford, (1914) 7
Sask. L. Rep. 443, 31 West. Rep. 13.
58Gibbs v. Messer, [1891] A.C. 248, 60 L.J.P.C. 20, 64 L.T. 237. The
reason for this distinction is explained by the court in Assets Co. v. Mere
Roihi, [1905] A:C. 176, 204 74 L.J.P.C. 49 to rest on the fact that where
the forged deed runs to a fictitious person, there has been no transfer
away from the original owner and no transfer upon which the subsequent
registration could operate.
5 0See Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6903.
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have held that the earlier certificate took precedence over the
later.
60
Discussion of the conclusiveness of a Torrens certificate would
be incomplete without mention of certain interests in the land
which may not appear upon the face of the certificate, in addition
to the possibilities of fraud or want of jurisdiction considered
above. Most of these are mentioned in the statute itself.6
Mechanic's Liens. The Minnesota statute provides that all
liens, trusts, mortgages, and the like shall be filed with the Regis-
trar of Titles to be binding upon registered land. 2  But inas-
much as mechanic's liens may be filed within ninety days after
the completion of work or the furnishing of the last item of the
account,63 it is quite possible for such a lien to be outstanding
and not shown upon the certificate of title. A purchaser during
this time could not rely conclusively upon the face of the certifi-
cate and would probably take subject to the lien.64  But recording
the lien with the register of deeds is not notice to him.65
Taxes and Assessments. Needless to say, unpaid taxes and
assessments do not appear on the face of the certificate. More-
over, they survive registration. The state is not bound by a de-
cree which omits to mention them.
66
Rights in Public Highways. These also survive registration.67
60Oelkers v. Merry, (1872) 2 Q.S.C.R. 193; Miller v. Davy, (1889)
7 N.Z.L.R. 515. The earlier prevails as far as it goes, even if it only
partly comprises the land comprised in the later certificates. Stevens v.
Williams, (1886) 12 Vict. L. R. 152. For a discussion of the subject, see
Hogg, Australian Torrens System 823; Niblack, An Analysis of the
Torrens System of Conveying Land, sec. 153, p. 237.
61See Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892.62Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6914.
63Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 7026.
6 4Hacken v. Isenberg, (1918) 210 Ill. App. 120 (semble).
6 5Application of Bickel, (1922) 301 Ill. 484. 134 N.E. 76; Hacken v.
Isenberg, (1918) 210 Ill. App. 120; McMullen & Co. v. Croft, (1917) 96
Wash. 275, 164 Pac. 930. But compare, Chicago and Riverdale Lumber
Co. v. Vellanga, (1922) 305 Ill. 415, 137 N.E. 212, (where registration of
owner's deed not made at time lien filed).
6 6Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892 (2); National Bond & Security Co.
v. Daskam, (1903) 91 Minn. 81, 97 N.W. 458. See also, Canada Per-
manent Mortgage Corp. v. Martin, et al., (1909) 2 Sask.L.R. 472; Suther-
land v. Spruce Grove, (1918) 14 Alta.L.R. 284, 1 W.W.R. 274. The state
cannot be made a party to Torrens proceedings without its consent. National
Bond & Security Co. v. Daskam, (1903) 91 Minn. 81, 97 N.W. 458. The
Registrar cannot voluntarily enter memorials of taxes and assessments due
on the certificate, and memorials so entered may be expurged. Curtis v.
Haas, (1921) 298 Ill. 485, 131 N.E. 701.
"
7Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892 (4).
TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Leases. Leases of three years duration or less, where there is
actual occupancy, need not be registered, and consequently survive
registration. 8
Rights of the United States. A decree of registration does not
bind the United States.c9 Its rights survive and inure to its ven-
dees.7
0
Right of Appeal. A decree of registration cannot be conclu-
sive, of course, pending appeal or as long as the right to appeal
from it is still open.71
Adverse Possession. The Minnesota statute provides:
"No title to registered land in derogation of that of the regis-
tered owner shall be acquired by prescription or by adverse pos-
session.
-7 2
In the absence of such a provision, there is a split of authority
as to whether title to land already registered can be acquired by
adverse possession.7" The Nebraska act now expressly provides
that ten years adverse possession will deprive a registered owner
of his title.
74
In conclusion, it is apparent that a Torrens certificate is not
as conclusive as an examination of the statute under which it is
created would lead one to believe. It is regrettable, perhaps, but
probably unavoidable under a constitutional form of government
where property rights are carefully guarded. To sum up: There
are certain interests which the Torrens statutes themselves pro-
vide shall survive registration, such as rights of the United
States. Where there has been fraud or forgery, the registration
is not conclusive until the title gets into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser for value. Where there has been lack of jurisdiction
of necessary parties in the proceedings incident to a decree of
registration, it is an open question whether the rights of such
parties do not survive even as against a bona fide purchaser; they
68Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892 (3).69Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892 (1).
70Shevlin-Mathieu Lumber Co. v. Fogarty, (1915) 130 Minn. 456, 153
N.W. 871.71Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6892 (5) ; Dewey v. Kimball et al., (1903) 89
Minn. 454, 95 N.W. 317, 895, 96 N.W. 704.72Minn., G.S., 1913, sec. 6869.73Title to registered land can be acquired by adverse possession, Belize
Estate and Produce Co. v. Quilter, [1897] A.C. 367, 66 L.J.P.C. 53, 76
L.T.R. 361; Harris v. Keith, (1911) 3 Alta. L. R. 222; Wallace v. Potter,
(1913) 6 Alta. L. R. 83, 10 D.L.R. 544. See also, Hogg, Registration of
Title to Land throughout the Empire 84-90.74Nebr., C.S. 1922, sec. 5735.
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certainly do as against anyone else. Lastly, where land has been
validly registered, a purchaser of it takes free and clear, in the
absence of actual fraud, of all unregistered interests, except
probably in Minnesota and a few other jurisdictions, where he
must be a purchaser free from notice and not merely free from
actual dishonesty.
